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TAX EQUALITY: ELIMINATING THE LOW
EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES FOR
PRIVATE EQUITY PROFESSIONALS
SHRILAXMI S. SATYANARAYANA t

INTRODUCTION

The issue of income classification-ordinary income versus
capital gains income-has received considerable media scrutiny
in the past eighteen months with respect to private equity funds,1
as large private equity firms have gone public, and information
about their management structures and compensation practices
have been subject to disclosure.2
Private equity funds are
partnerships that invest in companies and/or entire business

t J.D. Candidate, December 2008, St. John's University School of Law; M.B.A.,
1998, William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, University of
Rochester; A.B., 1995, Barnard College. The author would like to thank Professors
Jacob L. Todres and Robert A. Ruescher for their insight and guidance. In addition,
the author would like to thank Allan A. Wiesel and the other editors and staff of the
St. John's Law Review; and Anne MacEwen, Audrey Schwarz and Vijay
Satyanarayana for their comments on earlier drafts. The author would especially
like to thank her family for their unwavering support and encouragement,
particularly Uma and B.R. Satyanarayana, and Vishwas and Akash Prabhakar.
I While the issue affects fund management firms generally, this Note focuses on
private equity funds specifically, given the increased scrutiny they have faced in
light of several high profile initial public offerings on the public stock exchanges.
Indeed, given that hedge funds, another category of fund management firms,
actively trade their underlying assets in order to exploit market opportunities, it is
unlikely that they are affected by the current debate: The short holding periods of
the underlying assets disqualify their treatment as long-term capital assets, and
they are subject, therefore, to ordinary income treatment. See JOHN RUTLEDGE,
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF INCREASING CARRIED INTEREST TAX RATES ON THE U.S.

ECONOMY 11 (2007); see also Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership
Profits in PrivateEquity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15 (2008).
2 See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, Private-Equity Tax Strategy Draws Attention in
Congress, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2007, at B4; David Cay Johnston, Tax Loopholes
Sweeten a Deal for Blackstone, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at Al. See generally Lee A.
Sheppard, Blackstone Proves CarriedInterests Can Be Valued, 115 TAX NOTES 1236
(2007).
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units, manage them, and then sell them off at a profit.3 The
investments in the companies and/or business units generally
qualify as capital assets.4 Private equity firms typically retain
ownership of their equity stakes for several years. 5 Given that
the minimum holding period for the sale of a capital asset to
qualify for long-term capital gains treatment is one year, the
profit received on disposal of these private equity investments
therefore takes the form of a long-term capital gain and is subject
to lower tax rates than the sales of capital assets that are held
for one year or less.6
The general partners of the private equity fund make the
investment decisions regarding the companies in which the fund
is invested, while the limited partners provide investment
capital.7 For their investment decisions, the general partners are
compensated in two ways: First, they receive two percent of the
assets under management annually as a management fee, on
' See Fred F. Murray, Uncertainties Increase for Taxation of Private Equity
Investments, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), June 27, 2007, at 1.
' A capital asset is defined as "property held by the taxpayer, (whether or not
connected with his trade or business)," but excludes certain items such as inventory,
property used in trade or business qualifying for depreciation, real property used in
trade or business, copyright, literary, musical or artistic composition, or similar
property created by or created for the taxpayer, accounts receivable acquired in the
ordinary course of business, and other assets. I.R.C. § 1221(a) (West 2008). Although
arguably the ownership stakes acquired by the private equity firms could be viewed
as property that is used in "trade or business," they are neither real property nor
depreciable, and hence they qualify as capital assets. See 4 BORIS I. BIrrKER &
LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 1 47.3
(2003).
5 See Carried Interest, Part II: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th
Cong., 1 (2007) [hereinafter Senate Hearings II] (statement of Bruce Rosenblum,
Chairman of the Board, The Private Equity Council), available at http://finance.
senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2007test/ 073107testbr.pdf.
6 See 4 BIrTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 4,
49.1 ('Gain or loss on a sale or
exchange of a capital asset is long-term capital gain or loss only if the property was
held for more than one year; it is short-term capital gain if the property was held for
one year or less.").
' See Senate Hearings H, supra note 5, at 1 (statement of Bruce Rosenblum,
Chairman of the Board, The Private Equity Council). General partners also invest
some capital in the partnership, but their primary contribution is in the form of
investment and management expertise to the funds. See id. at 2 (noting that general
partners contribute "3-10% of the partnership's overall investment capital"); see also
Senate Hearings H, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of William D. Stanfill, Founding
Partner, Trailhead Ventures, L.P.), available at http://finance.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony/2007test/073107testws.pdf (noting that the general partners in
his fund "invest at least 1% of the fund's capital").
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which they are taxed at ordinary income tax rates, and second,
they receive 20 percent of the fund's profits, the "carried
interest,"' for which they are often taxed at the lower capital
gains rate. The capital gains rate on the 20 percent profit share
is permissible under current Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.")
rules because the partnership itself receives the profits in the
form of capital gains, and through pass-through principles, it
retains that character when it flows through to the individual
partners. 9
Given that private equity professionals receive
significant remuneration via the carried interest, ° and are taxed
at the lower capital gains rate, Congress, in contemplation of
legislation subjecting carried interests to the higher ordinary
income marginal tax rate, held hearings during the late summer
and early fall of 2007 to understand the economics of these
arrangements and to understand the arguments both in favor of
and against the current tax treatment. 1'
Private equity professionals assert that their investments
12
are "integral to capital formation and liquidity in this country"
and
contend that imposing a higher marginal
tax
rate would result in the "sky... fall[ing] and... private
8 This is known as a profits interest in tax parlance because the interest is in
the partnership's profits, not its capital. See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343
(defining a capital interest as "an interest that would give the holder a share of the
proceeds if the partnership's assets were sold at fair market value and then the
proceeds were distributed in a complete liquidation of the partnership" and a profits
interest as "a partnership interest other than a capital interest"). Throughout this
Note the terms profits interest and carried interest will be used interchangeably.
9 See I.R.C. § 702(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). This section states:
The character of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit
included in a partner's distributive share under paragraphs (1) through (7)
of subsection (a) [describing the forms of income inclusions] shall be
determined as if such item were realized directly from the source from
which realized by the partnership, or incurred in the same manner as
incurred by the partnership.
Id.
10 See Johnston, supra note 2 ("Questions in Congress about possibly raising
taxes on such compensation were prompted in part by publicity about the rich
rewards for people who run these firms. Stephen A. Schwarzman, the co-founder of
the Blackstone Group, made nearly $400 million last year, for example.").
11 The Senate Finance Committee held hearings on July 11 and July 31, 2007,
and the House Ways and Means Committee held a hearing on September 6, 2007 on
"Fair and Equitable Tax Policy for America's Working Families," in which the tax
treatment of investment fund managers was considered.
12 Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 1 (statement of Bruce Rosenblum,
Chairman of the Board, The Private Equity Council).
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equity... shrivel[ing] up and d[yingl.""' According to these
professionals, the imposition of higher marginal tax rates would
result in fewer deals getting funded in the United States,
hampering the United States' economy.1 4 In addition, they
contend that the current tax treatment is appropriate for
encouraging risk taking with respect to funding companies that
have difficulty raising capital from traditional sources.1 5
In contrast, proponents of change to the current tax
structure maintain that increasing the marginal tax rate is
necessary to ensure equality and fairness.' 6 Individuals in other
high paying professions, such as executives and lawyers, are
subject to taxation at the ordinary income tax rate, whereas
private equity managers are taxed at the long-term capital gains
rate, because their income is structured in the form of carried
interests.'7 In addition, they claim that warnings of a precipitous
drop in private equity funding as a result of proposed tax code
changes are spurious, given that private equity managers do not
bear risk to the same extent as do entrepreneurs, 8 and that

13
14

Id. at 7.
See id.; see also Steve Forbes, Private Equity, Public Benefits, WALL ST. J.,

July 25, 2007, at A14 ("Raising taxes on private equity doesn't just harm fund
managers or investors-it also harms the companies that need private equity
investments to bring their innovations to market, which, in turn, makes our entire
economy less competitive.").
I, See Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 7; see also Carried Interest, Part I:
HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong., 9 (2007) [hereinafter Senate
Hearings 11 (statement of Kate D. Mitchell, Managing Director, Scale Venture
Partners), available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2007test/071107
testkm.pdf.
[The Venture Capital] fund structure encourages the pooling of labor and
capital by allowing the partners to divide the profits from the enterprise-.
whether created by the VCs' labor or the combination of the VC and
[Limited Partners'] capital-in whatever manner they determine best
rewards the long-term, entrepreneurial risk taken by each partner....
...[Ilt
is appropriate to reward investors of sweat equity with the same
long-term capital gain tax benefits that investors of financial equity
receive.

Id.

16 See Senate HearingsI, supra note 15 (opening statement of Sen. Max Baucus,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Finance), available at http://finance.senate.gov/
hearings/statements/07 107mb.pdf.
17 Id.
18 See Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of Joseph Bankman,
Ralph M. Parsons Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School), availableat
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2007test/073107testjb.pdf.
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many investments tend to be made in a relatively narrow
geographic area to facilitate monitoring. 19
This Note will evaluate the arguments by both challengers
and proponents to tax reform with respect to carried interests
and propose two methods to bring about change in the tax
treatment. This Note will conclude that a change in the tax code
is needed to maintain equality and fairness, given that the
as
considered
appropriately
is more
interest
carried
compensation. In addition, in light of advances in financial
valuation techniques, the existing tax treatment is inappropriate
and section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code, which addresses
the taxation of property received as compensation, should be
applicable to the receipt of carried interests.
Part I of this Note will recount the chronology of the existing
tax treatment, laying out the partnership and section 8320
landscapes, including a discussion of Diamond v. Commissioner
and Campbell v. Commissioner,2' and the resulting Treasury
regulations.2 2 Part II will evaluate arguments opposing and
supporting any changes to the current scheme of allowing carried
interests to be treated as capital gains. Finally, Part III will
conclude that subjecting carried interests to inclusion in ordinary
income under section 83 of the I.R.C. is a reasonable approach to
equalizing income tax treatment of compensation, particularly in
light of advances in financial valuation techniques, before which
the valuation of profits interests was more difficult. In the
alternative, this Note will assert that cutting off the source of the
capital gains treatment, namely by denying the pass-through
treatment for carried interests in partnerships, is also a viable
alternative.

I.

SETTING THE SCENE-PARTNERSHIP AND ORDINARY INCOME

TAX PRINCIPLES
This Part outlines the primary sections of the I.R.C. that
affect the carried interests of private equity partnerships. Part

'9
See Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of William D. Stanfill,
Founding Partner, Trailhead Ventures, L.P.).
20 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
21 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
22 See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343; Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191;

I.R.S. Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221.
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L.A defines partnership capital and profits interests and
disu se te relevant partnership taxation provisions, including
the pass-through treatment of partnership income. Part I.B
discusses section 83 of the I.R.C. (which addresses restricted
stock awards), its legislative history, demonstrating similarities
to the current debate on private equity carried interests, and the
rationale for excluding partnership profits interests from its
treatment. This foundation is important, as Part III asserts that
section 83 provides an adequate framework for taxing the
partnership profits interests as ordinary income.
Finally,
Part I.C sets forth the current treatment of partnership carried
interests, which is a combination of the two areas-the relevant
partnership provisions and section 83-along with the two
seminal cases, Diamond and Campbell, and the ensuing
Treasury regulations that have resulted in the current favorable
tax treatment for carried interests. An understanding of the
existing tax treatment is necessary to appreciate the
contemporary debate over whether to maintain the status quo
that is discussed in Part II.
A.

PartnershipTaxation Scheme

In order to understand the current treatment of partnership
profits interests, it is first necessary to distinguish between the
two types of partnership interests-the capital interest and the
profits interest. A capital interest is "an interest that would give
the holder a share of the proceeds if the partnership's assets were
sold... and then the proceeds were distributed in a complete
liquidation of the partnership. This determination generally is
made at the time of receipt of the partnership interest. ' 23 Thus,
an individual receives a partnership capital interest if he is
entitled to receive a share of the existing value of the
partnership's assets.2 4 Since the value of the capital interest is
based on the existing value of the partnership's assets, the value
of that interest may be valued without much difficulty, with
reference to those underlying assets.

23 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
24

See 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON & ROBERT L. WHITMIRE,

FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS

5.03[1] (2007).
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The profits interest, in contrast, is defined as "a partnership
interest other than a capital interest."25 The profits interest is
not valued based on the value of the partnership's existing assets
since the partner receiving such an interest does not receive a
share of the partnership's existing assets, but rather receives
payment based on future income; the value of that future income
is uncertain at the time the profits interest is granted.2 6 Due to
the speculative nature of the profits interest and the limitations
on its valuation, profits interests have not been taxed on receipt
traditionally.2 7
The current favorable taxation treatment of profits interests
is a function of the partnership taxation scheme that treats the
partnership as a pass-through entity whereby the partnership's
income flows through to the individual partners and is taxed to
Critical to the
the individuals and not to the entity.2"
preferential treatment of the carried interest is the general
partnership taxation principle that in allocating the income and
expense amounts to each individual partner, the items retain the
character that they bear at the partnership level. 29 Thus, to the
extent the partnership realizes a long-term capital gain through
the disposition of a capital asset, that gain retains the capital
gains characterization when it passes through to the individual
partners to be taxed.
Generally, neither the partnership nor a partner recognizes
a gain or loss on property contributions exchanged for a0
partnership interest, and therefore, no tax is assessed .

Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
See id. ("[Clourts have.., found that typically the profits interest received
has speculative or no determinable value at the time of receipt.").
27 See, e.g., Campbell v. Comm'r, 943 F.2d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 1991) ("More
troubling.., is [the] argument that the profits interests... received had only
speculative, if any, value. We fully agree with this contention.. ").
28 See I.R.C. § 701 (2000) ("A partnership as such shall not be subject to the
income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall
be liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities."); see also
MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 24, 1.01[1].
29 See I.R.C. § 702(b).
10See id. § 721(a). According to I.R.C. section 721(b), I.R.C. section 721(a) does
not apply to transfers of property to partnerships that would be treated as
investment companies within the meaning of I.R.C. section 351, were the
partnerships to be incorporated. See id. § 721(b); see also MCKEE, NELSON &
4.01[1] [a] (noting also that nonrecognition applies
WHITMIRE, supra note 24,
22
26
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However, an individual receiving a partnership capital interest
under sections 61 and 83 of the I.R.C. 31 Treasury Regulation
section 1.721-1(b)(1) is explicit that "[tlo the extent that any of
the partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid his
contributions (as distinguished from a share in partnership
profits) in favor of another partner as compensation for services,"
section 721, relating to nonrecognition of gains or losses, is
inapplicable.2 Furthermore, the fair market value of the capital
interest received as compensation by a partner is included in
gross income.
The valuation is as of the time the transfer was
made for past services, or at the time services have been
rendered in the case where transfer of the property is conditional
on completion of the recipient's future services. 34 The timing of
realization, however, is dependent on "all the facts and
circumstances,
including any substantial restrictions or
conditions on the compensated partner's right to withdraw or
35
otherwise dispose of [the] interest."
On the other hand, the tax treatment of a profits interest
received as compensation for services performed is more complex.
This is due in part to the fact that the value of that interest is not
based on the value of the partnership's existing assets, as
previously mentioned. Part C discusses the issues with respect
to carried interests after reviewing the section 83 landscape in
more detail.

regardless of whether the contribution takes place at the time of partnership
formation or later).
31 See McKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 24,
5.01, 5.02[11; see also id.
4.01[1] [a] (noting that nonrecognition under I.R.C. sections "721 through 723 [is]
applicable only if 'property' is contributed to the partnership. A major consequence of
this limitation is that transactions in which partnership interests are issued in
exchange for services are not eligible for nonrecognition treatment under
section 721"). Sections 722 and 723 concern the partners' basis in and adjustments
to basis in property contributions to the partnership. See Campbell, 943 F.2d at 820
("When a service partner receives an interest in partnership capital, the cases
clearly hold that a taxable event has occurred. The receipt of the capital interest
must be included in the service partner's income.").
" Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1996).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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Internal Revenue Code Section 83-PropertyReceived in
Exchange for Services

When a taxpayer is compensated with property for having
provided services, he is taxed at ordinary income tax rates on the
amount by which the fair market value exceeds any payments he
may have made for the property himself 6 According to section
83, that value is recognized in the taxpayer's income in the first
taxable year in which he enjoys ownership rights in the
property-when the property is transferable or is not subject to a
3
substantial risk of forfeiture, as applicable7.
Thus, a person who
receives compensation in the form of non-statutory restricted
stock 38 or other property is taxed on it at ordinary income tax
levels in the year that it is no longer forfeitable or in the year in
which restrictions on its transferability lapse.
Congress enacted section 83 during the 1960s in response to
the widespread use of restricted stock options to reduce tax
liability after a debate that mirrors today's carried interest
3
dialogue9.
Back then, as today, Congress was concerned that
certain already well-remunerated individuals were able to
structure their compensation in a tax-advantageous manner to
avoid paying their appropriate tax liability.4"
Congress
determined that maintaining fairness in the tax scheme was
critical and enacted a change to the tax law to provide for the
recognition of income where property is received in exchange for
services. 41 While section 83 was enacted in response to the
problem uncovered regarding restricted stock plans, it has wider
applicability than to just those plans, and as this Note argues
later, it can be used to tax the partnership carried interests. But,
to see how closely the issues surrounding carried interests and
restricted stock plans parallel each other, it is useful to review
the history of section 83.

36

I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).

37 Id.
18 Non-statutory

restricted stock does not meet the requirements established in
I.R.C. section 421, which provides for non-recognition of income by the taxpayer on
the exercise of qualifying stock options. See id. § 421(a)(1).
" See H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645,
1734; H.R. REP. NO. 110-413, at 136 (2007).
40 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 1645; H.R. REP. No. 110-413, at 136.
41 H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 1645.
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Congress enacted section 83 of the I.R.C. in 1969 to remedy
inequities in the tax scheme relating to restricted stock plans.42
Under prevailing regulations at the time, executives receiving
non-statutory restricted stock were not subject to immediate
recognition of income on receipt of stock options containing
restrictions that appeared to have no independent business
justification; the options were being used as a means of providing
tax-deferred compensation to the recipients.4 3 By structuring
stock grants with time restrictions, companies were able to
compensate certain employees in a manner that allowed tax to be
deferred until that restriction lapsed. The individuals would
then be taxed at a lower rate because recognition would be
deferred until the individual had retired from employment and
would therefore be in a lower tax bracket. In addition, to the
extent tax was owed on the increase in value between the time of
stock transfer and the time of the lapse of the restriction, it
would be treated as a capital gain.4 4 Congress sought to remove
this loophole in enacting section 83 by disregarding the time
restriction for tax purposes and requiring recognition of incomethe excess of the fair market value of the stock over any
consideration paid by the employee-on receipt of the stock
either if the interest in that property were transferable or if it
The
were not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.4 5
for
property
subject
to
exceptions for income recognition
restrictions on transferability and substantial risk of forfeiture
acknowledged limitations imposed by law and by legitimate
business needs.4 6
42 See id. at 1645, 1733-35.

4 See Bureau of National Affairs, Tax Management Portfolios, 83.9 [hereinafter
BNA]. (Edwin S. Cohen of the Treasury Department testified before the House Ways
and Means Committee, "[W]e recommend that restrictions barring sale for a
specified number of years not be given any effect for tax purposes. On the other
hand, restrictions under shareholders' agreements which do not expire by lapse of
time, and thus are prompted by bona fide business rather than tax considerations
would be taken into effect." (emphasis added)).
" See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 1734; see also BNA, supra note 43 at 83.9,
Technical Explanation of Treasury Tax Reform Proposals.
45 See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 1735.
41 See BNA,
supra note 43, at 83.9. (Edwin S. Cohen of the Treasury
Department testified before the House Ways and Means Committee, "[Riestrictions
under shareholders' agreements which do not expire by lapse of time, and thus are
prompted by bona fide business rather than tax considerations would be taken into
effect. Also, restrictions imposed by law would be taken into account."); see also S.
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In enacting this change, Congress rejected arguments
claiming that such a change would discourage companies from
giving employees a stake in the business, stating that it had
already provided for such goals through the use of qualified stock
The motivating factor for the restricted stock plans
options."
was compensation rather than providing employees with an
ownership stake in the business.4" Even though the measure
would not result in significant revenue gains to the fisc,4 9
Congress noted the need for fairness in the tax scheme: "If
on a voluntary basis
taxpayers are generally to pay their taxes
50
they must feel that these taxes are fair."
Section 83 contained the following exceptions to its
applicability: (1) a transaction to which section 421 relating to
stock options applied; (2) pension and profit sharing plans; (3) the
transfer of an option without a readily ascertainable fair market
value; 51 or (4) the transfer of property pursuant to the exercise of
an option with a readily ascertainable fair market value at the

REP. NO. 91-552 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2152 ("[Tlhe
committee feels that restrictions which by their terms never lapse-for example, a
requirement that an employee sell his stock back to the employer at book value or
some other reasonable price if he terminates his employment-are not tax motivated
and should be distinguished from restrictions designed to achieve deferral for tax
saving purposes.").
47 See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 1735.
4'See id. at 1734-35 (noting that the I.R.C. provisions for statutory stock
options included specific requirements that were "designed to decrease the
compensatory nature of stock options and to place more emphases on stock options
as a means of giving employees a stake in the operation of their business").
49 See BNA, supra note 43, at 83.13 (noting that an argument against enacting
the proposed change was that "[1]ittle revenue appears to be involved; hence there is
no real benefit accruing from making a change").
50 See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 1645. In pushing for the inclusion of restricted
stock in gross income, Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Policy, testified before the Senate that "[olur self-assessment tax system depends
upon equitable rules under which each persons [sic] pays a fair share of his income
tax. Permitting certain forms of compensation arrangements to be taxed at capital
gains rates while others are taxed as ordinary income creates serious inequities in
the individual income tax." BNA, supra note 43, at 83.20.
51Difficulties in valuation are arguably less of an issue today than they were in
1969, with advances in financial modeling. For example in 1973, Nobel Laureate
Robert Merton published a comment on options valuation using the Black-Scholes
option pricing model in the Journal of Finance. See Robert C. Merton, The
Relationship Between Put and Call Option Prices: Comment, 28 J. FIN. 183, 183-84
(1973). The Black-Scholes model is widely used in financial valuation.
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date of grant.5 2 While the third exception excludes options
havig
uL t
v wLsp
lului
iiiiiiIeUluLe
bLaXabliil
reueipb,
"11
1IO
exceptions were made explicitly with respect to partnership
interests received in exchange for services performed to that
partnership. However, due to valuation concerns, section 83 has
not been applied to profits interests received in exchange for
53
services performed to a partnership.
Although Congress sought to end the tax gamesmanship
through the restricted stock loophole, it did not eliminate it
completely. The Senate added a provision allowing employees to
elect to recognize income on receipt of nontransferable property
even if it were subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, thus
permitting capital gains treatment for any subsequent gains
realized on the disposition of that property.5 4 If the property
were later forfeited, however, no deduction would be allowed for
the value forfeited on which tax previously had been paid, "
although the amount paid for the property, "as distinguished
from the amount included in income as a result of the election,"
may be deducted as a loss on forfeiture.56 Thus, Congress
allowed employees receiving restricted stock to elect to prepay
their income taxes and thereby obtain capital gains treatment on
subsequent sales of the restricted stock, but at the same time
eliminated the ability to subsequently recapture the taxes paid if
the stock value actually declined.
The fact that Congress
specifically did not permit tax recapture in such a scenario is
important, for it should also apply in the carried interest
context.57
Since this provision would prevent recipients of
52 See I.R.C. § 83(e) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). A fifth exclusion for group-term life
insurance subject to I.R.C. section 79, was subsequently added. See H.R. REP. No.
91-413, at 1736.
' See supra Part L.A and infra Part I.C; see also MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE,
supra note 24, 5.01 (noting that "by administrative fiat, the receipt of partnership
profits interest for future services to the issuing partnership or past services
rendered to, or for the benefit of, the issuing partnership generally is not treated as
a taxable event" absent certain conditions); Fleischer, supra note 1, at 10 (stating
that "valuation and other considerations prevent the tax law from treating this
receipt [of the profits interest] as a taxable event").
4 S. REP. No. 91-552 (1969), as reprintedin 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2152-53.
55 See I.R.C. § 83(b); see also S. REP. No. 91-552, at 2154.
'6 3 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 4,
60.4.3 n.59 (2005); see also Treas.
Reg. § 1-83.2(a) (1978) (indicating that losses in excess of the amount paid for the
property over the amount received on forfeiture would be treated as a realized loss).
"' See infra Part II.B.
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restricted stock from recapturing tax paid on income not actually
received-arguably a larger population than carried interest
recipients-there is no compelling reason for preventing its
application to partners receiving carried interests.
C.

Blending InternalRevenue Code Section 83 and Partnership
Taxation-Diamond, Campbell, and the Aftermath

It would appear that section 83 should apply to profits
interests since they are property received in exchange for the
provision of services; however, "by administrative fiat [it] is not
treated as a taxable event, unless either (a) the profits interest
relates to a 'substantially certain and predictable stream of
income from partnership assets' or (b) within two years of receipt,
the partner disposes of the profits interest."58
This
administrative position has evolved as a consequence of judicial
decisions,5 9 the two major ones being Diamond v. Commissioner °
and Campbell v. Commissioner,6 1 in which both the valuation and
speculative nature of profits interests have proved troublesome.
Although the Diamond case pre-dates the enactment of
section 83,2 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
decision in favor of the Internal Revenue Service.6 3 The court
held that the profits interest in the partnership was includible in
the partner's gross income where the taxpayer sold the
partnership interest soon after receipt, but the court generally
questioned the practicality of treating the profits interest as
compensation, given the difficulties in determining fair market
value where the interest was not disposed of so quickly.6 4 In
Diamond, the taxpayer obtained a 60 percent profits interest in a
partnership in exchange for arranging the financing to acquire
an office building.6 5
The partnership was entered into on
58 McKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 24,
5.01 (quoting Rev. Proc. 9327, 1993-2 C.B. 343).
59 See Senate Hearings I, supra note 15, at 5 (statement of Eric Solomon,
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy), available at http://www.senate.gov/
-finance/hearings/testimony/2007test/071107testes.pdf.
60 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).
61
62

943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
Although the case was decided in 1974, the tax year at issue was 1962.

Diamond, 492 F.2d at 286-87.
1 See id. at 291.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 286.
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December 15, 1961, and on February 18, 1962, the office building
was purchased.On March 8, 1962, the taxpayer sold his
partnership interest to a third party for $40,000.67 The taxpayer
reported the proceeds of the sale as a short-term capital gain,
against which he offset unrelated short-term capital losses,
resulting in no tax consequences; 68 however, the Tax Court ruled
that the taxpayer's acquisition of the profits interest constituted
compensation for services, worth $40,000, and was includible as
ordinary income.6 9 In so concluding, the Tax Court, and the
Seventh Circuit in upholding the decision, went against the
"substantial consensus of commentators."70
In the nearly two decades that have elapsed between
Diamond and Campbell, the issue was not litigated frequently.7 '
The IRS "made no overt move to embrace or reject Diamond.
Instead, it tried to avoid the issue by controlling efforts of field
agents to raise it." 72 During that intervening period, Congress
enacted section 83 of the Internal Revenue Code. As a result,
when Campbell was litigated, the Tax Court considered the
relevance of section 83 to the issue, and found the section to
apply.7 3 In Campbell, the taxpayer received limited partnership
profits interests in three partnerships "in exchange for services
he had rendered in the formation and syndication of [those]
partnership[s]." ' Unlike in Diamond, however, the taxpayer did
I Id. at 287.
67

Id.

68 Id.
69 A key finding necessary to support the conclusion was that the property had a
determinable value given that the purchase of the building occurred on February 18,
and the profits interest was sold less than three weeks later. See id. at 287-88.
70 See id. at 289; MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 24, 1 5.02[11 (noting
that the commentator's position had been drawn by negative implication contained
inTreasury Regulation 1.721-1(b)(1) from the language "[to the extent that any of
the partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid his contributions (as
distinguished from a share in partnershipprofits) in favor of another partner as

compensation for services ... , section 721 does not apply").
71 See MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 24, 5.02[3] (noting that there

were only four cases dealing with the receipt of profits interests by partners during
this time period).
72 Id.
" See Campbell v. Comm'r, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236, 236 (1990) (noting that "the
determination of when Mr. Campbell should be required to include in income the
value of the partnership interests he received ... is governed by section 83"), affd in
part, rev'd in part,943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
74 Id.
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not dispose of these interests immediately, which was a critical
distinction.7 5
While the Tax Court held that the limited
partnership profits interest constituted income to the taxpayer
and hence was includible in his gross income, the Eighth Circuit
reversed.7 6 In so doing, the Eighth Circuit noted the critical
distinction that while the taxpayer in Diamond "did not intend to
function as or remain a partner," this was not the case in
Campbell, for the taxpayer's partnership interests "were not
transferable and were not likely to provide immediate returns."7 7
This distinction contributed to the overall assessment that the
value of the partnership interest was too speculative and hence
ought not to have been included in gross income.78
Although the Internal Revenue Service succeeded in
persuading courts that section 83 applies to profits interests in
partnerships,7 9 in 1993, the Treasury Department promulgated
Revenue Procedure 93-27, under which the receipt of a profits
interest in exchange for services rendered would not be
considered a taxable event to either the partner or the
partnership, subject to certain exceptions. 0 These exceptions"the profits interest relates to a substantially certain and
predictable stream of income from partnership assets, such as
income from high-quality debt securities"; the partner disposes of
the partnership interest within two years of receipt; or the profits
75 See id.

" Campbell v. Comm'r, 943 F.2d 815, 823 (8th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 822-23.
Id. at 823. While this rationale may appear to support the position that the
taxpayer's intent is more relevant to valuation than the length of the holding period,
it is doubtful that the Eighth Circuit intended to provide a standard that could be
easily manipulable by a person simply asserting that she intended to hold onto the
property for a longer time period. Some objective factor, beyond the taxpayer's
control would also likely be required. For example, in the area of financial reporting,
companies holding debt securities to maturity must have the "positive intent and
ability" to actually hold the securities in order to qualify for favorable accounting
treatment. A company that sells held-to-maturity securities for reasons other than
certain enumerated objective factors would need to reclassify the entire held-tomaturity portfolio to the less favorable available-for-sale designation. See FIN.
77
78

ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
No. 115: ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN INVESTMENTS IN DEBT AND EQUITY SECURITIES

4 (1993), availableat http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas15.pdf.
79 See MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 24,
5.02[7]. See generally
Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of CarriedInterests, 116 TAx NOTES 183 (2007).
80 See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343; see also Senate Hearings I, supra note
15, at 5 (statement of Eric Solomon, Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy).
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interest is a limited interest in a "publicly traded partnership"indicate that the valuation of the profits interest is not
speculative and therefore, deny the nonrecognition treatment if
any applies to the interest in question."'
In 2001, the Treasury Department issued Revenue
Procedure 2001-43 to clarify the treatment specified in Revenue
Procedure 93-27.2 The 2001 Revenue Procedure specified that
the nonrecognition treatment would apply with respect to a
profits interest received for services rendered, as of the grant
date, where: (1) "[the partnership and the service provider treat
the service provider as the owner of the [profits] interest from the
date of its grant and the service provider" accounts for it
appropriately for the entire period during which she holds the
interest; (2) neither the partnership nor any of the partners
"deducts any amount ...for the fair market value of the
interest," on grant of the interest, or at the time it becomes
substantially vested; and (3) the exceptions specified in Revenue
Procedure 93-27 do not apply. 3
In other words, Revenue
Procedure 2001-43 clarifies that "the determination under
Revenue Procedure 93-27, as to whether a partnership interest
is a profits interest, is made at the time the interest is granted
even if the interest is substantially nonvested at that time,
provided that certain requirements are met."' For profits
interests meeting the requirements of both Revenue Procedure
93-27 and Revenue Procedure 2001-43, neither the grant of the
profits interest nor the event that causes that interest to become
substantially vested will be treated as a taxable event for the
partner or the partnership. 5
More recently, the Treasury Department issued Proposed
Revenue Procedure 2005-43, which is designed to ensure that
neither a partnership nor its partners may take a deduction with
respect to a profits interest transferred to a service partner, for
which under the prevailing revenue procedures tax is not owed. 6
The proposed revenue procedure does so "by requiring ...the
81
82

84

See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B, 343.
See Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 CB 191.
See id.

MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 24,

1 5.04[2].

s See id.
See Senate Hearings I, supra note 15, at 5 (statement of Eric Solomon,
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy).
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partnership and its partners [to] make an affirmative election to
determine the fair market value of the partnership interest
transferred to service providers by reference to its liquidation
value.""7 The significance of the proposed revenue procedure lies
in the fact that it makes section 83 applicable to profits
interests.88 In effect, the proposed revenue procedure allows
service providers receiving the profits interest to make a section
83(b) election, when the liquidation value of the partnership is
zero, allowing the continued capital gains treatment for such
interests. 9
II.

THE DEBATE OVER CARRIED INTERESTS' TAXATIONARGUMENTS AGAINST AND IN FAVOR OF CHANGE

As previously stated, the favorable tax treatment of
partnership carried interests has garnered considerable attention
in the past eighteen months, as large private equity funds have
gone public.9 ° While the topic has been debated among tax
professionals since the Diamond case was decided,9 1 it has not
received such attention by the wider public until now. On one
side of the debate are those within the affected structures who
contend that the favorable tax treatment is critical to encourage
individuals to take risks in developing and running businesses
that are not guaranteed to succeed. On the other side of the
debate are those who argue that the exploitation of legitimate
partnership taxation principles is fundamentally unfair as
already highly-compensated individuals gain an unimagined
boost through tax rates that are twenty percentage points below
the ordinary income level. This Part considers those arguments
in more detail, first addressing arguments opposing reform
before turning to arguments in favor of it.

87 Id.

" See MCKEE, NELSON & WHITMIRE, supra note 24, $ 5.02[8] (noting that the
new approach "while consistent with the general § 83 scheme, stands in marked
contrast to the administrative practice under Revenue Procedure 93-27, as
supplemented by Revenue Procedure 2001-43, pursuant to which the receipt of a
partnership profits interest was treated as a nontaxable event without further
action on the part of the recipient of that interest or the partnership").
" See Sheppard, supra note 2; see also Fleischer, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that
even with the proposed regulations, the status quo would be reaffirmed).
90 See supra note 1.
91 See Abrams, supra note 79.
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The proponents of the current tax scheme for carried
interests, namely those within the industry, argue that
maintaining the status quo is imperative for nurturing
innovation and preserving the United States' economic
leadership.
They contend that without the favorable tax
treatment, service partners would not have an incentive to take
an active management role to ensure the success of their portfolio
companies and so would become little more than passive
investors. 92 Such a "scenario would be potentially devastating to
the entrepreneurial community that actively seeks venture
capital for the. . . expertise ... they receive alongside the
financial investment. 9 3
In addition, supporters of the existing tax treatment cite
their own fairness rationale:
Given that the capital gains
treatment is available to every American, "fundamental fairness
requires that the tax code not single out certain investors for less
favorable treatment because they are, for example, private equity
partners, or because they are successful."9 4
However, this
argument overlooks
the fact that "the capital gain
preference... is being used to reduce taxes not on investment,
but on the labor income of some of the most highly paid citizens
in the nation,"9' which is surely not available to "every
American."
A related argument that has been raised is that the
structure of these partnerships is not designed with tax
avoidance in mind. Rather, it is a means of aligning the general
partners' interests with those of the limited partners. Indeed,
general partners are subject to "clawback" agreements whereby
general partners must return distributions "to the extent of any
subsequent losses in other investments of the fund."96 Even were
9' See Senate Hearings I, supra note 15, at 12 (statement of Kate D. Mitchell,
Managing Director, Scale Venture Partners).
9' See id.
9' Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 6 (statement of Bruce Rosenblum,
Chairman of the Board, The Private Equity Council).
95 Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 4 (statement of Joseph Bankman, Ralph
M. Parsons Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School).
' Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of Bruce Rosenblum,
Chairman of the Board, The Private Equity Council).
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the carried interests considered analogous to bonuses that are
paid out when employees and/or firms meet certain targets, and
on which ordinary compensation taxation applies, the latter is
generally based on annual performance, whereas the general
97
partners' carried interest is based on multi-year performance.
In addition, while the payment of an incentive bonus reduces the
value of the business, the payment of the carried interest means
that "the business was sold and a third party has paid [the
general partner], leaving the assets and value inside the
business.""
Arguably, however, as long as the employee
receiving the bonus payments remains with the employer and
continues to meet performance targets, thus continuing to earn
the incentive payments, the employee continues to add value to
the employer's bottom line and, as such, is the employer's asset.
After all, the incentive payments are granted in recognition of
that employee's accretive value to the employer's net income
and/or asset base. In contrast, the general partner who was so
instrumental in increasing the value of the portfolio company is
not involved in that company to the same extent, if at all, once
the company has been sold.
Another argument in favor of maintaining the status quo is
that raising the taxation on carried interest would result in
detrimental gamesmanship that would cost the United States'
economy.9 9
Private equity individuals would likely expend
resources unproductively to develop strategies to minimize their
income tax burdens, rather than productively managing their
portfolio companies. In some cases, this could involve shifting
operations offshore to jurisdictions having lower relative tax
" See Senate Hearings I, supra note 15, at 11 (statement of Kate D. Mitchell,
Managing Director, Scale Venture Partners).

98 Id.

See Senate Hearings II,supra note 5, at 7 (statement of Bruce Rosenblum,
Chairman of the Board, The Private Equity Council) ("[T]o suggest that a 130% tax
increase will have no effect on behavior is quite optimistic.... It is a mistake to
assume that nothing will change if Congress profoundly alters the basic business
model on which our industry has been organized and operated with great success.");
Fleischer, supra note 1, at 49 (observing that "[c]hanging the treatment of a profits
interest in a partnership would create new pressures on the system"); see also Senate
Hearings I, supra note 15, at 13-14 (statement of Kate D. Mitchell, Managing
Director, Scale Venture Partners) (asserting that a change to a less favorable tax
regime would accelerate the relocation of venture capital firms from the United
States to overseas markets that have more favorable tax structures).
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burdens compared to the United States. While some firms may
s.illub blltl
upj'atiours UVefsebai, hlUb all Will U ill a pusIlUii to d0
so. And, to the extent they are funding United States-based
businesses, such a move would be impractical since they would
be less able to actively monitor their investments. 100
Finally, in addition to the economic arguments already
discussed, opponents of change argue that given the speculative
nature of the carried interests, it is not practical to include them
in gross income due to difficulties in valuing them.1 0 ' While this
traditional argument may have been valid during an earlier era,
improvements in financial modeling have resulted in better,
albeit not necessarily perfect, gauges of value. 0 2 As a result,
carried interests may be valued, and indeed, several estimates of
valuation have been derived. For example, in its registration
statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Blackstone provided a value for its carried interests. 0 3 In
addition, Professor Michael S. Knoll has applied traditional
options valuation methodology to determine a value for private
equity carried interests.0 4 Similarly, Andrew Metrick and Ayako
Yasuda have surveyed existing compensation structures for
venture capital and buyout firms-two segments of the private
100

Cf Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 3 (statement of William D. Stanfill,

Founding Partner, Trailhead Ventures, L.P.) ("My firm is too small to play in the
international field-the learning curve is too steep and the expenses are too high.
And if you are doing seed investing, we've always found sufficient deals in our own
backyard.").
101 See supra Part I.C.
102 For example, the securitization market developed beginning in the 1970s as
a way of creating liquidity in the mortgage market. Securitization involves
valuations of underlying collateral in order to structure bonds that can be sold to
third-party investors. See supra note 51 (discussing the publication of the BlackScholes options pricing methodology).
103 See The Blackstone Group L.P., Amendment No. 9 to Form S-i, (Form S-i/A),
at 122 (June 21, 2007) (estimating the general partner carried interest allocations at
$594.5 million, for the year ended December 31, 2006); see also Sheppard, supra note
2 ("Even the most speculative partnership profits interest has an option value;
somebody would pay something for it.... There is a value that is not only good
enough for government work, but also is good enough for financial accounting, as the
recent Blackstone public offering documents demonstrate."); Michael S. Knoll, The
Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Effects of
Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income 9 (Inst. for Law & Econ., Univ. of Pa.
Law Sch., Research Paper No. 07-20, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1007774 (explaining that the "carried interest is effectively a call option"
and utilizing standard options pricing theory to derive a value).
104 See Knoll, supra note 103, at 10-11.
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equity universe, the former specializing in new companies, and
the latter focusing on relatively more mature companies-and
have applied options valuation methodology and regression
analysis to estimate the average present value for private equity
carried interests based on the private equity fund's assets
invested.10
Thus, including carried interests in gross income,
through section 83, is a more reasonable option than it was at the
time Campbell was decided. Indeed, the Treasury has explicitly
stated that there is no "substantial basis for distinguishing
among partnership interests for purposes of section 83," despite
the litigation history culminating in Campbell."6
B.

Leveling the Playing Field-Arguments in Favorof Change

For the tax system to be viable, taxpayers need to believe
that it is fair.'07 In the private equity context, fund managers are
able to "defer the tax on income derived from their human
capital... [and] convert the character of that income from
ordinary income into [tax-preferential] long-term capital
gain[s]."' l s Individuals toiling outside the partnership structures
and not in receipt of carried interests do not similarly benefit
from either the deferral or, more significantly, the lower effective
tax rate, regardless of their compensation level.1 °9 In essence,
these fund managers have managed to convert the "income

105

See Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity

Funds 47 tbl.VI (Swedish Inst. for Fin. Research Conference on the Econ. of the
Private Equity Mkt., Sep. 9, 2007), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=996334.
106See Partnership Equity for Services, 70 Fed. Reg. 29675, 29676 (proposed
May 24, 2005) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
107 See H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1645,
1645.
108 Fleischer, supra note 1, at 3.
109See, e.g., Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 2-3 (statement of William D.
Stanfill, Founding Partner, Trailhead Ventures, L.P.) ("All workers add value-to a
greater or lesser extent.... But the tax rate on [private equity] carried interest[s] is
less than the tax on [other workers'-such as landscapers and teachers]earnings."); Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 1 (testimony of Joseph Bankman,
Ralph M. Parsons Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School) (implying
that "our best and brightest young people" are more likely to become venture
capitalists and the like in order to benefit from the lower tax rates); Senate Hearings
I, supra note 15, at 1 (opening statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Finance) ("[Pirofessional athletes, Silicon Valley executives, and lawyers on
contingency fees will also often take home a great deal of income.... [that is] based
on performance. But they tend to pay taxes at the ordinary income rate.").
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derived1-from
their human
capital" into long-term capital gains. 110
.I1
. -A
VVWie high comipensation leveis appear to attract people to the
private equity industry, it is not obvious that the preferential tax
treatment is an added lure.111
This transformation in the character of income is all the
more unfair given that the fund managers themselves have
11 2
relatively small sums of money at risk in the partnerships.
General partners are taking risks with other people's money
rather than with their own, and therefore, are less analogous to
entrepreneurs.13 In addition, although industry representatives
equate their role to that of entrepreneurs,
with respect to the
1 14
idea of "sweat equity" this is not accurate.
xzn_ -1

[While entrepreneurs] may work for years with little or no pay,
betting [their] entire economic future[s] on the success of [their]
idea[s], invention[s] or efforts[,] [flund managers perform
intermediation and advisory services [for which tihey receive
generous management fees and benefit from the performance of
a portfolio of companies, the success of each of which1 5is
dependent on the inspiration and efforts of the entrepreneur.
Thus, by exploiting legitimate partnership tax provisions,
general partners of these private equity funds have managed to
convert their human capital into tax deferred long-term capital
110 Fleischer,

supra note 1, at 3.
I" See id. at 5 (observing that "[wihile the high pay of fund managers is well
known, the tax gamesmanship is not"); see also Louise Story, Bye, Bye B-School,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, § 3, at 1. ("As more Americans have become abundantly
wealthy, young people are recalculating old assumptions about success.... Many
college graduates who are bright enough to be top computer scientists or medical
researchers are becoming traders instead, and they measure their status in dollars
instead of titles.").
12 See
Fleischer, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that the general partner's
contribution to the fund ranges from 1 to 5 percent of the fund's total capital). But
see Senate HearingsII, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Bruce Rosenblum, Chairman
of the Board, The Private Equity Council) (stating that general partners contribute
between 3 to 10 percent of the fund's overall capital). Nonetheless, even if general
partners contribute 10 percent of the fund's overall capital, third parties, who are
the limited partners, contribute 90 percent of the funding.
.. See Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 3 (testimony of William D. Stanfill,
Founding Partner, Trailhead Ventures, L.P.) ("To the extent [fund managers] take
risk[s], [they] take it with other people's money.").
114 "Sweat equity" refers to the value created through hard work by the owners.
See Investopedia, Sweat Equity, www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sweatequity.asp
(last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
"I Senate HearingsII, supra note 5, at 3 (testimony of Joseph Bankman, Ralph
M. Parsons Prof. of Law and Business, Stanford Law School).
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gains, and thus avoid paying their fair share of tax, violating
fundamental fairness.
Perhaps one response to the fundamental fairness argument
is that the private equity professionals are merely taking
advantage of tax preferences expressed by Congress that are no
different from advantages granted to other segments of society,
such as members of the clergy and members of the armed
services.1 16 While the obvious answer to this response is that
such tax preferences expressed by Congress were the result of
express congressional action, rather than the effect of
administrative sympathy, a review of the legislative history
governing section 702(b) of the I.R.C. proves the fallacy. In 1938,
Congress specifically enacted the predecessor to section 702(b) to
prevent individual partners from applying capital losses to offset
ordinary income and avoid any tax liability. 117 Thus, far from
being a tax preference for partners, the income characterization
rules of section 702(b) are meant to prevent partners from
enjoying tax benefits that are denied to other taxpayers.
While private equity firms unquestionably serve an
important role in the economy, the exploitation of partnership
pass-through principles undermines the fairness of the tax
system, thus requiring a change to the status quo. Part III of
this Note discusses two alternative proposals.
See I.R.C. § 107 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) (exempting certain housing
allowances and the value of housing provided as part of a clergy member's
compensation from inclusion in gross income); I.R.C. § 112 (2000) (exempting from
gross income compensation received for active service members for months during
which they served in a combat zone, or were hospitalized due to wounds, disease or
injury incurred while serving in a combat zone, subject to certain limitations).
11 See J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAx LAwS 1938-1861, at 90 (1938). Prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of
1934, partners were able to
use their allocable shares of the partnership capital net losses to offset not
merely net gains from their individual capital transactions but their
ordinary incomes as well. The grave abuses and widespread avoidance of
income taxes resulting from this fact was the principal reason for
[subsequent changes that aimed to curtail this abuse].
Id. (quoting the HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, 75th Cong. (Jan.
14, 1938)). In the 1938 legislation, the House recommended that
in the case of a partnership, net short-term capital gains, net short-term
capital losses, net long-term capital gains and net long-term capital losses
be segregated from the ordinary net income, and carried into the
computation of the individual partner's income as thus segregated.
116
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III. RESTORING A MEASURE OF EQUALITY-Two REFORM
This section considers two primary proposals for reforming
the carried interest taxation scheme: (1) explicitly bringing
partnership profits interests within the fold of section 83; or in
the alternative (2) cutting off the pass-through treatment of
income when the profits interest is being used to compensate
service partners.
A.

Subjecting Profits Interest to Internal Revenue Code Section
83

Under section 83, the excess fair market value of property
received in exchange for services performed over the amount paid
for the property, if any, is to be included in gross income in the
first taxable year in which the rights of the recipient are
transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture. 1 8 Taxpayers are permitted to make an election to
subject the property received to immediate taxation in the year of
transfer, even if the property is restricted, and thus preserve the
capital gains treatment for any subsequent appreciation in that
property.1 9 However, to the extent that the property on which
the election is made is subsequently forfeited, the taxpayer is not
permitted to take a deduction with respect to the taxes that were
paid on the forfeited property. 120 Nevertheless, the taxpayer is
permitted to treat the excess of any amount paid for the property
over any amount realized on the forfeiture as a realized loss,
characterized as either ordinary or capital based on the
characterization of the underlying asset that was forfeited."'
With respect to the private equity and venture capital funds,
general partners' carried interests are subject to "clawback"
provisions, pursuant to which should the limited partners fail to
receive a return of their invested capital along with a hurdle
rate, the general partners forfeit as much of their entitlement to
the profits interest as is necessary to make the limited partners

1, See I.R.C. § 83(a) (2000 & Supp.
119 See id. § 83(b).
120 See id.
121

IV 2004).

See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) (1978).
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whole.12 2 The hurdle rate is the minimum return required by the
limited partners in order to make an investment. As such, the
clawback provision can be viewed as a "substantial risk of
forfeiture" under section 83, since it is a continuing restriction
over the life of the fund, and the general partner must continue
to service the portfolio companies successfully throughout the life
of the fund.12 3 As a result, in these cases, the issuance of a profits
interest would not subject the general partner to taxation;
rather, taxation is deferred until the general partner actually
realizes that interest, and since inclusion would be required
under section 83, the general partner would be taxed on that
interest as compensation, rather than as capital gains.
While it has been argued that such treatment is
inappropriate, given that the general partner's remuneration is
really a combination of compensation and capital gains, 124 section
83 provides an opportunity for this split treatment via the section
83(b) election. Under the section 83(b) election, as previously
stated, the taxpayer would have the option of paying tax on the
carried interest in the year of issuance without giving effect to
the restrictions. For example, suppose that a service partner is
granted a profits interest with an expected value of $100, and for
which he has not made cash payments. There is an equal chance
that when the underlying company is sold, the service partner
receives either $50 or $150.
Since realization is subject to
significant effort to be expended by the service partner, the
property can be deemed to be subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture and therefore, under section 83(a), would not be
included in the service partner's gross income. However, the
service partner could make a section 83(b) election, and in the
year of the profits interest grant, it would include $100 in gross
income. At a future date, when the property is sold, if the
amount realized were $150, the service partner would report $50
in capital gains income-the difference between the $100 already
taxed as ordinary income and the $150 actually realized. Were
122

See Senate HearingsH, supra note 5, at 2-3 (statement of Bruce Rosenblum,

Chairman of the Board, The Private Equity Council).

123 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(1) (2005) (explaining that a substantial risk of
forfeiture arises "where rights in property that are transferred are conditioned,
directly or indirectly, upon the future performance (or refraining from performance)
of substantial services by any person").
124 See Abrams, supra note 79.
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the amount realized only $50, although the service partner would
realize a capital loss of $50, that loss could not be used to offset
125
capital gains income.
A difficulty with this proposal is that given that the
individual funds last for several years, valuations would require
several assumptions and as such, are vulnerable to
manipulation. Indeed, as has been argued, many funds do not
pay out carried interest shares at all. 126 As noted earlier,
however, valuation techniques have improved over time, and
financial modeling has also become more sophisticated, allowing
for more reasonable valuations. Furthermore, even allowing for
some degree of undervaluation, at least some portion of the
carried interest would be subject to taxation at ordinary interest
rates, which is better than the current situation. Therefore, a
section 83(b) election would have the advantage of providing
general partners with some capital gains treatment for their
carried interests, while at the same time restoring fairness to the
tax system by ensuring that a certain portion is taxed as
ordinary compensation for those who choose to make the election.
While the Treasury's 2005 proposed regulation, discussed above,
provides for a safe harbor election in which electing partnerships
set the profits interest at its liquidation value-that is, zerosuch a provision is not necessary, given improved valuation

techniques.

127

An underlying assumption in the example is that the service partner did not
have to pay anything for the profits interest. However, were he to have been
required to have paid the partnership some value on top of the services he provides
to the partnership, that cost basis could be deducted as a capital loss. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.83-2(a).
12' See Senate Hearings II, supra note 5, at 6 (testimony of Bruce Rosenblum,
Chairman of the Board, The Private Equity Council).
127 It is interesting to note that during the "dot com" bubble in the late 1990s,
many technology company employees received incentive stock option compensation
for which they were eligible to make I.R.C. section 83(b) elections. As the market
valuations for many of these companies were rising during this time, many
individuals chose not to make such an election. Unfortunately, by the time the
restrictions had lapsed, the bubble had deflated and many of these people were
subject to tax on property that was worth far less than the associated tax. While the
section 83(b) election would not have eliminated the situation, it would have
mitigated it. See generally Robert L. Sommers, ISOs Meet the AMT: Employees
Ambushed by the Tax Code, 91 TAX NOTES 2055 (2001). In fact, for certain
individuals, a section 83(b) election was not an option at all. Id. Thus, eliminating
the 2005 safe harbor provision removes the insulation from "compensation risk," or
125
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Granting private equity professionals the ability to make a
section 83(b) election would enable them to maintain some
measure of capital gains treatment for a portion of their efforts,
while still subjecting them to taxation at ordinary income levels.
However, as the example above demonstrates, to the extent that
some of the income on which tax was subjected via the section
83(b) election is forfeited, these individuals incur sizeable cash
outlays for tax payments on election and real economic costs due
to the non-realization of that estimated income. As such, the
ability to elect for immediate recognition of income via section
83(b) should remain an option and not be a mandatory
requirement. Such a proposal is consistent with the discretion
currently granted to persons receiving other forms of property in
Indeed, since private equity
exchange for their services.
professionals would be provided with the same discretion granted
to other taxpayers, a measure of fairness would be restored to the
tax system.
Cutting Off Pass-Through Treatment When Interests Are
Used as Compensation
An alternative to requiring carried interests to be subject to
section 83 is to eliminate the pass-through treatment of section
702 in the limited instance where profits interests are being used
to at least partly compensate service partners.1 28 While critics
would argue that such a targeted provision unfairly singles out a
particular industry or group, 129 such an approach is not without
Congress has, for example, targeted investment
precedent.
companies in denying the nonrecognition treatment of gains or
losses where "property is transferred to a corporation by one or
more persons solely in exchange for stock in such corporation and

B.

the risk that compensation will be less than foreseen, that individuals other than
service partners bear.
128 This approach has been proposed by Professor Mark Gergen, who advocates
amending I.R.C. section 702 to require that the distributions be treated as ordinary
income, "regardless of the character of the underlying assets sold by the
partnership." Fleischer, supra note 1, at 51.
129 See supra Part II.A (discussing fairness principles); see also RUTLEDGE,
supra note 1, at 3 ("By calling for punitive tax treatment of certain sectors, and
industries, those who would raise tax rates risk undermining America's preeminent
position in the world as a leader in invention, innovation, entrepreneurial activities,
and growth." (emphasis added)).
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.. -__1966, Congress sought to prevent the simulation of untaxed
mutual funds that were created using the tax-free transfer
13 1
mechanism of section 351(a).
Similarly, and in a directly related area, the Senate is
recently contemplated legislation that would bar partnerships,
primarily in the finance fields, from taking advantage of the
exemption for publicly-traded partnerships with passive income
under section 7704(c), and not being subject to income tax on
becoming public entities. 32 Under the bill that was considered
by the Senate, the exception would not apply to partnerships that
directly or indirectly derive income from investment adviser
services or related asset management services. 3 3 The bill was
proposed in the wake of several high profile initial public
offerings by large private equity firms. 134 The existence of the bill
demonstrates that Congress is not averse to targeting specific
industries when it determines they are unfairly taking
advantage of the tax code.
In being denied pass-through treatment under section 702,
service partners would not be able to qualify for capital gains
treatment and would be required to treat the profits interest as
compensation. The grant of a profits interest would be treated as
contingent compensation, whereby the partner would have no
income on receipt of the carried interest, but would be taxed at
ordinary income rates on all the profits allocated to him. 135 By
taxing the profits when allocated as opposed to taxing the carried
interest on receipt, the concern that the service provider may
undervalue the carried interest is mitigated. 3 6
This approach has the advantage of being simple, and would
more closely align the carried interest treatment with that of
130 See I.R.C. § 351(a); see also I.R.C. § 351(e) (stating the exception to the
general nonrecognition rule provided in I.R.C. section 351(a)).
131 See 4 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 4,
91.2.2.
132 See I.R.C. § 7704(c)(2).
133 See S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007); see also H.R. 2785, 110th Cong. (2007).
134 Jesse Drucker, Private-Equity Tax Strategy Draws Attention in Congress,
WALL ST. J., July 14, 2007, at B4.
135 See Mark
P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating Service
Partners,48 TAX L. REV. 69, 86 (1992).
136 See id. at 102.
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nonqualified stock options.137 At-the-money nonqualified stock
options are the corporate equivalent of a partnership profits
interest. 138
However, a difficulty does arise in terms of
appropriately distinguishing the extent to which the returns to a
partner who contributes both capital and labor are attributable
to the labor component. 39 In addition, it is perhaps unrealistic to
expect that general partners would continue to structure their
compensation in such a manner without altering the structures
to again achieve some type of favorable return. 40 However, "a
half a loaf is better than none-a portion of the manager's return
will be taxed as compensation."'
CONCLUSION

The current favorable tax treatment violates the
fundamental notion of fairness in the tax system. Given that
many individuals in the private equity industry are highly
compensated, it offends notions of fair play to discover that their
compensation is taxed well below the ordinary compensation
rates. This Note has sought to highlight two alternative taxation
systems that would restore fairness in the system by restoring
the compensation treatment of carried interest given that these
profits interests are more appropriately viewed as ordinary
income rather than capital gains.

See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 51.
See id. at 4.
139 See Gergen, supra note 135, at 107-08. For example, in a two-person
partnership, if each partner contributes capital and labor to the same extent, the
income received would be treated as a return on capital, because they would each
receive a 50 percent share in the income of the partnership. See id. at 107. However,
this is less of an issue in the private equity context where the partners do not
contribute capital and labor in equal shares. In this situation, any income received
in excess of the proportional capital contribution would be treated by the partner as
a return on labor or compensation.
140 See Fleischer, supra note 1, at 51.
141 See Senate Hearings I, supra note 15, at 6 (testimony of Mark P. Gergen,
Fondren Chair for Faculty Excellence, University of Texas School of Law), available
at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2007test/071107testmg.pdf.
137
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